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3The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) offers states the option 
to implement the Basic Health Program 
(BHP).   BHP gives states 95 percent of 
what the federal government would have 
spent on tax credits and subsidies for out-
of-pocket costs for two groups:
•	 Adults with income between 133 and 
200 percent of the federal poverty level 
(FPL); and
•		Legally resident immigrants with 
incomes below 133 percent FPL whose 
immigration status disqualifies them 
from federally matched Medicaid. 
If a state implements BHP, these two 
groups of consumers cannot receive 
subsidized insurance in the exchange. 
Instead, the state covers them by 
contracting with health plans or providers. 
Such contracts must provide at least the 
minimum essential benefits under ACA, 
and consumers may not be charged more 
than what they would have paid in the 
exchange. 
Rather than analyze the full range of state 
options for implementing BHP, this paper 
focuses on strategies that reduce health care 
costs for low-income residents. Of course, 
ACA’s tax credits and other subsidies will 
make coverage much more affordable to the 
uninsured, but research suggests that the 
amounts charged in the exchange could still 
deter many low-income consumers from 
signing up for coverage. A further deterrent 
to enrollment could be consumers’ fear 
of owing money to the Internal Revenue 
Service at the end of the year if their annual 
income turns out to exceed what consumers 
anticipated when health insurance tax 
credits were paid during the course of the 
year. Finally, among some low-income 
adults who sign up for coverage, out-
of-pocket costs could delay or prevent 
utilization of necessary care.
The BHP option permits states to sidestep 
these obstacles by giving low-income 
residents “Medicaid look-alike” coverage 
or “CHIP [Children’s Health Insurance 
Program] for adults,” with lower consumer 
costs than will be charged in the exchange 
and without any risk of beneficiaries 
incurring year-end tax debts. In many, if 
not most, states, the federal government 
would pay all the costs of such coverage. 
Primarily because provider payments 
are higher with private insurance than 
with Medicaid, federal BHP payments are 
projected to exceed by 29 percent what it 
would cost Medicaid to cover BHP-eligible 
adults in the average state.  
This projection assumes that plans in health 
insurance exchanges will charge premiums 
like those in current private markets. If 
premiums in the exchange—hence, tax 
credits—exceed anticipated levels, then 
federal BHP payments will be higher than 
the amounts estimated here. Conversely, 
if premiums are lower than expected—
for example, if an exchange obtains low 
premium bids, or inexpensive Medicaid 
plans join an exchange and cause tax credits 
to be set at low levels—then federal BHP 
funding will fall below projected levels. 
Notwithstanding these factors, if premiums 
in the exchange are similar to those charged 
by today’s insurers, a state may be able to 
integrate BHP, Medicaid, and CHIP into 
a single, rebranded program serving all 
uninsured residents with incomes up to 
200 percent FPL. Although cost-sharing 
could rise modestly as income increased 
above 133 percent FPL, the same health 
plans would provide coverage so long as 
income remained below 200 percent FPL, 
thus improving continuity of care. In 
addition, if “safety net” plans with a history 
of operating in low-income communities 
do not offer coverage through the 
exchange, they could nevertheless continue 
serving low-income consumers when 
incomes rise above Medicaid levels.
This approach would let states save money 
by eliminating optional Medicaid eligibility 
for adults above 133 percent FPL, who 
include pregnant women in most states. 
Of course, states could achieve the same 
savings by ending Medicaid for adults 
above 133 percent FPL and moving them 
into the exchange. But BHP could give the 
state equivalent savings without increasing 
costs or reducing benefits for currently 
eligible, low-income adults.
From the consumer’s perspective, a serious 
disadvantage of this “Medicaid/CHIP 
lookalike” approach to BHP is that, in 
most states, provider payment—hence, 
the breadth of provider networks—would 
be lower than in the exchange. However, 
if federal BHP payments to states exceed 
baseline Medicaid costs, BHP provider 
reimbursement could likewise exceed 
Medicaid amounts. As with many CHIP 
programs, provider participation could fall 
between Medicaid and private levels. 
Another strategy for BHP implementation 
would let consumers choose between 
Medicaid plans and subsidized coverage 
in the exchange. Such a “two-way” bridge 
between public programs and the exchange 
would promote continuity of coverage 
and consumer flexibility. However, plan 
choices could be overwhelming to many 
consumers, and states would need to guard 
against adverse selection and compensate 
plans for the difference between BHP 
payments and subsidies in the exchange.  
From the state’s perspective, implementing 
BHP using any of these approaches will 
have the disadvantage of reducing the 
size of the exchange. Instead of covering 
8 percent of non-elderly residents, the 
average state’s individual market in the 
exchange would serve 6 percent. As a result, 
the proportion of residents receiving either 
individual or group coverage through 
the exchange would decline from 16 to 
14 percent. Such reductions are unlikely 
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4to threaten exchange viability, but they 
would decrease the number of participants 
among whom exchanges spread fixed 
administrative costs.  
BHP implementation could affect the 
average risk level of the remaining 
individual enrollees in the exchange, but 
the net effect will probably be modest in 
most states. ACA requires insurers to pool 
all customers in the individual market, 
inside and outside the exchange. If ACA’s 
insurance rules work as intended, BHP 
implementation will change risk levels in 
the entire individual market. As a result, 
the impact on average costs will be less 
than if BHP’s effects were limited to the 
exchange. 
That impact might be eliminated entirely 
if the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) permits states 
to adopt policies requiring BHP plans to 
share risk with insurers offering individual 
coverage. Under this approach, a state-
licensed insurer that participates in BHP 
would pool its BHP members with its 
other individual enrollees. And whether 
or not a BHP plan is sponsored by a 
state-licensed insurer, it would participate 
in state-administered risk-adjustment 
and reinsurance mechanisms. If HHS 
allows such policies and they succeed, 
BHP implementation would simply 
shift enrollees among plans that share 
risk, without changing average costs per 
consumer. 
A full analysis of BHP implementation 
along the lines described here requires 
state-specific information, building on 
the national estimates presented in this 
paper. Further, federal authorities have not 
yet settled important questions about the 
meaning of relevant ACA provisions. And, 
without doubt, some states will pursue 
approaches to BHP that differ greatly 
from the general directions described here. 
That said, for state officials interested in 
improving affordability and continuity of 
coverage for low-income residents while 
maximizing state budget savings, using 
BHP to build on the existing infrastructure 
of Medicaid and CHIP is an option that 
deserves serious consideration. 
5The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) offers states the option 
to implement the Basic Health Program 
(BHP) for low-income residents who 
are ineligible for Medicaid. This paper 
describes ACA’s rules for BHP, explores 
selected approaches that states could take 
to implement BHP, and analyzes key issues 
that such approaches would raise for 
consumers and states.  
What is the Basic  
Health Program? 
Structure and federal funding
In a state that implements BHP, eligible 
consumers may not obtain subsidized 
coverage in the exchange. Instead, they 
are covered through state contracts with 
health plans or providers. To support these 
contracts, the state receives 95 percent of 
what the federal government would have 
spent if BHP enrollees had received tax 
credits and subsidies for out-of-pocket 
(OOP) costs in the exchange. The federal 
dollars are placed in a state trust fund and 
may be used only “to reduce the premiums 
and cost-sharing of, or to provide 
additional benefits for, eligible individuals 
enrolled in” BHP.1 The U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
makes one BHP payment to a state before 
a federal fiscal year begins, based on the 
best available projections. If the amount 
turns out to be too high or too low, HHS 
makes an offsetting correction in the next 
year’s payment. Although the issue has 
not been resolved by HHS, it seems likely 
that federal BHP funds may be used to pay 
BHP administrative costs.2
Eligibility 
To qualify for BHP, consumers must have 
the following characteristics:3
•		They are U.S. citizens or lawfully present 
immigrants under age 65;
•		Their income does not exceed 200 percent 
of the federal poverty level (FPL);4 
•		They do not qualify for coverage 
available through Medicare, Medicaid, 
or the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP); and
•		They are not offered employer-
sponsored insurance (ESI) that meets 
ACA’s standards for affordability and 
comprehensiveness.5
BHP thus covers two distinct groups of 
otherwise uninsured consumers:
•		Adults6 with Modified Adjusted Gross 
Incomes (MAGI) between 133 and 200 
percent FPL; and
•		People with incomes at or below 133 
percent FPL who are ineligible for 
federally matched Medicaid because 
of immigration status—for example, 
because they were granted status as lawful 
residents within the past five years.7  
If Congress fails to fund federal CHIP 
allotments beyond 2015, a third group 
might also qualify for BHP—namely, 
children with incomes between 133 and 
200 percent FPL who would have received 
CHIP if federal allotments had continued. 
Without BHP, such children could 
presumably go into the exchange,8 much 
like adults in the same income range.   
Coverage 
To implement BHP, a state uses a 
competitive process to contract with 
health plans or provider groups that meet 
the following requirements:
•		All minimum essential benefits under 
ACA are covered.
•		The BHP consumer is not charged 
premiums that exceed what the 
consumer would pay in the exchange.9
•		The consumer receives coverage with 
an actuarial value that meets or exceeds 
certain minimum thresholds.10
•		The plan is either a “managed care system 
…” or a “system … that offer[s] as many 
of the attributes of managed care as are 
feasible in the local health care market.”11 
This provision does not require the 
state to contract with a risk-bearing 
insurer, however. For example, states 
could implement a form of managed 
care that is common in Medicaid, which 
combines fee-for-service reimbursement 
with “primary care case managers” 
who receive monthly payments for 
coordinating care.12  
•		The state negotiates to have the plan 
or provider implement innovations 
that include “care coordination and 
care management,” “incentives for use 
of preventive services,” and efforts to 
“maximize patient involvement in health 
care decision-making” combined with 
“incentives for appropriate utilization.”13 
 “To the maximum extent feasible,” the 
consumer is offered a choice of plan 
options.14
•		If it is operated by an insurer: 
– The plan must report on state-
selected performance measures that 
focus on quality of care and improved 
health outcomes, sharing results with 
consumers and the state; and
–  The plan’s medical loss ratio—that 
is, the proportion of premium 
payments that go to health care and 
quality improvement rather than to 
administration—may not fall below 
85 percent. 
How states can use 
BHP to make coverage 
more affordable for low-
income residents
As the previous section makes clear, the 
BHP option gives states considerable 
flexibility to design coverage for their low-
income residents in ways that depart from 
some of ACA’s national rules. States could 
thus use the option to realize, with the 
Introduction
6BHP population, many different visions for 
covering the low-income uninsured. 
This paper does not explore the full range of 
possible approaches to BHP. Rather, it focuses 
narrowly on policies that, without spending 
any state funds, make low-income consumers’ 
coverage significantly more affordable than 
subsidized insurance in the exchange. After 
describing key affordability issues, this 
section explains why, in most states, federal 
BHP dollars could exceed Medicaid costs for 
BHP adults. It then shows how states could 
use BHP to improve the affordability of 
coverage and care for low-income residents 
without spending state dollars. It concludes 
by exploring trade-offs that consumers would 
face under these approaches.
Affordability of subsidized coverage 
in the exchange
Subsidy levels and limits
Without BHP in place, low-income subsidy 
recipients with incomes too high to qualify 
for Medicaid will make premium payments 
in the exchange and qualify for coverage 
with the actuarial values shown in Table 1. 
Low-income consumers’ premium payments 
are likely to increase slowly after 2014. 
Beginning in 2015, ACA caps premium 
subsidies to increase no faster than personal 
income, which has historically risen more 
slowly than health insurance premiums.16 If 
that pattern continues, subsidy recipients in 
the exchange will experience small annual 
increases in the percentage of household 
income required for premium payments.  
An additional limit on premium tax credits 
involves year-end reconciliation with the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). If credits 
provided during the year turn out to be 
too low, based on annual income reflected 
on federal tax returns, consumers receive 
a refund. But if tax credits are too high, 
beneficiaries must repay the excess, up to 
a “safe harbor” maximum that varies by 
income—$600 for a family at or below 200 
percent FPL, $1,000 between 200 and 250 
percent FPL, and so forth.17
Moving from premiums to OOP 
costs, actuarial value (AV) refers to the 
percentage of health care costs that an 
insurer pays for an average population 
by offering specific covered benefits, 
copayments, deductibles, co-insurance, and 
limits on OOP costs. Many combinations 
of cost-sharing rules and benefits fit each 
AV, complicating efforts to analyze the 
affordability of OOP costs for low-income 
consumers under ACA. 
One potentially fruitful approach looks 
at examples of coverage at applicable AV 
levels. According to the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS),18 the typical, 
employer-sponsored Health Maintenance 
Organization has an AV of 93 percent, 
which is approximately the AV for adults in 
the exchange with incomes at or below 150 
percent FPL. Such a plan has: 
•		No annual deductible; 
•		$20 office visit co-payments; 
•		A $250 co-payment for inpatient 
hospitalization; and 
•		Prescription drug co-payments of $10, 
$25, and $45 for generic, preferred 
name-brand, and non-preferred name-
brand drugs, respectively. 
At the AV level for consumers with incomes 
between 150 and 200 percent FPL, the 
federal Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan has an 
AV of 87 percent, according to CRS, with 
coverage that involves:
•		A $250 annual deductible;
•		$15 office visit co-payments;
•		A $100 co-payment for inpatient 
hospitalization, plus a requirement to pay 
10 percent of all remaining hospital costs;
•		A requirement to pay 10 percent of all 
laboratory and X-ray costs; and
•		A requirement to pay 25 percent of all 
prescription drug costs. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Minimum premium costs and the actuarial value of coverage for a single, uninsured 
adult at various income levels qualifying for subsidies under ACA
Percentage of FPL Monthly Pre-Tax Income Minimum Monthly 
Premium
Actuarial Value
150  $1,354  $54.15 94%
175  $1,579  $81.34 87%
200  $1,805  $113.72 87%
225  $2,031  $145.70 73%
250  $2,256  $181.63 73%
Notes: Dollar amounts assume 2010 FPL levels. If future FPL levels rise per Congressional Budget Office projections of increases to the 
Consumer Price Index15,  monthly pre-tax income and minimum monthly premiums in 2014 will be 6.4 percent higher than the amounts 
shown here. Actuarial value represents the average percentage of covered health care services paid by the insurer, taking into account 
deductibles, copayments, and co-insurance.    
Figure 1. Minimum monthly premium payments for a single adult at various FPL levels, 2010: 
ACA versus Massachusetts CommCare
150% 175% 200% 225% 250%
$54
$0
$81
$39
$114
$39
$146
$77 $77
$182
Massachusetts
ACA
Source: Massachusetts Commonwealth Connector 2010.21
7Potential effects on consumers
To some degree, it is a matter of opinion 
whether these premiums and OOP costs 
exceed what low-income consumers can 
afford. However, two facts are not in dispute:
•		ACA’s subsidies will make coverage and 
care substantially more affordable for 
low-income adults who lack access to 
ESI; but
•		In the past, premium and OOP costs 
such as those imposed by ACA have 
deterred many low-income consumers 
from enrolling into coverage and from 
using necessary care, sometimes with 
adverse effects on health status.19
Prior research showing the effects of 
premiums on low-income consumers’ 
enrollment took place without any legal 
requirement to purchase coverage, which 
will increase participation. As with ACA, the 
2006 Massachusetts reform law imposed 
such a requirement, which helped reduce 
the percentage of uninsured residents to the 
lowest level ever observed in any state.20 But 
consumers’ premium costs in Massachusetts’s 
subsidized Commonwealth Care 
(CommCare) program were less than what 
will be charged in the exchange under ACA, 
as Figure 1 illustrates. Premium costs under 
ACA may thus lead to enrollment levels 
that are lower than those in Massachusetts, 
notwithstanding ACA’s requirement to 
purchase coverage. 
As noted earlier, ACA exempts preventive 
services from point-of-service cost-
sharing. Accordingly, cost-sharing in the 
exchange may prevent some consumers 
from seeking treatment for illness, injury, 
or other health problems, but it should 
not affect check-ups, immunizations, and 
screenings. 
Some low-income consumers may be 
deterred from seeking tax credits during 
the year because year-end reconciliation 
could endanger tax refunds or require 
payments to IRS that many low-income 
people might view as unaffordable. Such 
reconciliation is one reason that no more 
than 3 percent of low-income workers who 
receive Earned Income Tax Credits claim 
those credits during the year, in advance 
of filing year-end returns.22 Put simply, 
the combination of limited subsidies in 
the exchange and the potential for adverse 
tax consequences could reduce the gains 
in coverage and access that low-income 
consumers would otherwise experience 
under ACA.
Federal BHP payments and  
state costs
A starting point for thinking about how 
BHP could make coverage more affordable 
for low-income residents without 
spending state money is that, in many 
states, federal BHP payments are likely 
to exceed Medicaid costs (including both 
state and federal shares). Mainly because 
of low Medicaid reimbursement rates for 
providers, private insurance is significantly 
more expensive than Medicaid, according 
to research that takes into account health 
status.23 For example, among working 
adults, private insurance premiums 
exceed Medicaid costs by an average of 
29.5 percent. It thus comes as no surprise 
that, according to the Urban Institute’s 
microsimulation modeling of ACA,24 
average federal BHP payments, based on 
the cost of subsidies for private insurance 
in the exchange, will exceed by 29 percent 
what it would cost Medicaid to cover BHP-
eligible individuals (Figure 2).    
The differential shown in Figure 2 
reflects more than low Medicaid provider 
payments, however. BHP adults, who 
tend to be young, will have higher 
premiums in the exchange (hence, higher 
BHP payments) than is warranted by 
their health care claims. With modified 
community rating, ACA permits the oldest 
adults to be charged no more than three 
times what the youngest adults pay for the 
same coverage, even though their health 
care costs vary by more than that ratio.25  
Figure 2’s comparison between BHP 
payments and Medicaid costs assumes 
that plans offered in the exchange 
charge premiums generally typical of 
today’s private insurance.26 Tax credits 
(hence, BHP payments) are pegged to 
the premium charged for the second–
lowest-cost plan at the “silver” level, 
which involves a 70 percent AV. If such a 
reference plan is more costly than what 
would be expected in today’s private 
markets, federal premium subsidies 
(hence, BHP payments) will rise above the 
amount shown in Figure 2. If the reference 
plan is less expensive, BHP payments 
will fall below projected levels; such a 
reduction could occur if, for example, a 
Medicaid-based plan that charges very low 
premiums becomes the reference plan27 or 
the exchange obtains surprisingly low bids 
from participating insurers.28 Accordingly, 
how a state operates its exchange could 
greatly affect federal BHP payments.  
Figure 2. BHP federal payments versus the cost to cover BHP members through Medicaid: 
national averages 
The average cost of covering a 
BHP-eligible adult through Medicaid
The average federal BHP payment
$3,624
$4,680
Source: Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 2011. Notes: These results show what would happen if ACA were fully 
implemented in 2010, with small employer and individual coverage merged into a single market. BHP payments would still exceed 
Medicaid costs, though by a smaller margin, if the two markets remained separate. Medicaid costs include both federal and state 
dollars and take into account the risk profile of BHP members. The average federal BHP payment equals 95 percent of what the federal 
government would pay in tax credits and OOP cost-sharing subsidies if BHP consumers had received coverage in the exchange.  
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probably decline slowly over time relative 
to health care costs. BHP payments are 
based on the tax credits for premiums 
and OOP cost-sharing subsidies that 
BHP members would have received in 
the exchange. After 2014, premium tax 
credits will be indexed to changes in 
annual income,29 which historically has 
grown more slowly than Medicaid costs. 
On the other hand, ACA’s subsidies for 
OOP costs are not limited by indexing. 
As a result, BHP payments, which reflect 
both premium tax credits and OOP cost-
sharing subsidies, will decline—relative 
to projected Medicaid spending—more 
slowly than tax credits alone. If trends 
from 2000 through 2007 continue, a state 
with federal BHP payments and Medicaid 
costs like those shown in Figure 2 would 
see its BHP payments continue to exceed 
Medicaid costs for more than 25 years.30 
Possible approaches to BHP 
implementation
States could use federal BHP resources 
in several ways to make coverage more 
affordable for low-income residents. 
Examples follow:
Using BHP to furnish more affordable coverage 
without building on existing public programs. 
A state might negotiate with private insurers 
to provide benefits like those offered in the 
exchange but with lower premiums and OOP 
cost-sharing. The precise approach would 
depend on policymakers’ goals. For example, 
some states might give beneficiaries financial 
incentives to join programs that address 
obesity, tobacco use, and substance abuse; 
other states might cover translation services, 
transportation, and case management that 
connects beneficiaries to social services.   
One disadvantage is that developing a new 
program requires administrative resources. 
After years of serious budget problems, many 
states will find it difficult to do even the 
minimum amount required to implement 
ACA, without designing and implementing 
a new, state-run program for low-income 
adults. In future years, creating such a 
program may be more feasible, but, in the 
short term, it is probably be more realistic for 
most states to adopt one of the approaches 
described next, each of which builds on 
existing programs rather than creates a new 
system from scratch. 
Using BHP to provide “Medicaid look-alike” 
coverage.31 BHP consumers enroll in the same 
managed care organizations that already 
contract with Medicaid.32 BHP consumers 
receive the benefits and cost-sharing 
protections that apply to Medicaid, even 
though applicable federal rules and funding 
arrangements differ.
Using BHP to fund a separate program styled 
as “CHIP for adults.” A state could raise cost-
sharing slightly above Medicaid levels for 
consumers with incomes between 133 and 
200 percent FPL. If a separate CHIP program 
is opened up to serve low-income parents 
and other adults, OOP costs will typically 
be lower than charges in the exchange, and 
covered benefits might be more generous. 
Provider payment could also rise above 
Medicaid levels, particularly if federal BHP 
payments exceed Medicaid costs.  
A state taking this approach could 
experiment with innovations such as value-
based insurance design and cost-sharing 
that gives consumers incentives to use more 
efficient providers.33 Similar initiatives could 
apply in CHIP to create a single system of 
innovative coverage serving both adults and 
children with incomes too high for Medicaid 
but too low to easily afford subsidized 
coverage in the exchange. 
Combining funding from BHP, Medicaid, and 
CHIP into a single, integrated program that 
serves all low-income residents. ACA does not 
require all BHP members to receive the same 
benefits and cost-sharing protections or to 
use the same provider networks. A state could 
thus operate a program with the following 
characteristics, shown in Table 2:
•  The program serves all otherwise 
uninsured34 state residents with incomes 
up to 200 percent FPL.
•  A single set of health plans provides 
coverage. Benefits could either be the same 
for all enrollees or grow more limited as 
income rises.
•  For consumers with incomes above 133 
percent FPL:
– Cost-sharing may increase above 
Medicaid levels, though the amounts 
would still be far below what is 
charged in the exchange; and
–  Provider payment levels may likewise 
increase, particularly if federal BHP 
payments exceed otherwise applicable 
Medicaid costs. 
•  Federal funding varies by enrollee:
–  Below 133 percent FPL:
l	 Medicaid matching funds pay 
for citizens and most lawfully 
resident immigrants, with 
enhanced payments for newly 
eligible adults; but
l		 BHP pays all costs for lawfully 
resident immigrants who do not 
qualify for federally matched 
Medicaid.
–  Above 133 percent FPL:
l		 The federal government entirely 
funds adults’ coverage through 
BHP;
l		 Medicaid or CHIP pays standard 
matching rates for children who 
qualify for those programs; and
l		 BHP pays for any children 
ineligible for Medicaid and CHIP.  
Differences between Medicaid, CHIP, 
and BHP would primarily be a matter 
of “back room” accounting to maximize 
federal funding.35 From the consumer’s 
perspective, a single program would 
provide coverage so long as income does 
not exceed 200 percent FPL. Officials 
in Connecticut have proposed a similar 
strategy.36
A state pursuing such an approach could 
“rebrand” low-income coverage to increase 
its appeal to consumers, the general 
public, and policymakers. Many states 
took similar steps in the late 1990s when 
they implemented CHIP by combining 
federal CHIP and Medicaid funds into a 
9single program that served all low-income 
children. 
Using BHP as a two-way bridge between 
Medicaid and the exchange. A state could offer 
BHP consumers a choice between Medicaid 
look-alike coverage and subsidized plans in 
the exchange. A state pursuing this strategy 
would need to require plans in the exchange 
to offer identical coverage in BHP. Because 
such plans would need to discount their 
premiums by 5 percent, a state taking this 
approach might let insurers compensate for 
BHP premium shortfalls by slightly increasing 
the premiums they charge in the exchange.37  
Such a policy would have the advantage of 
letting each BHP consumer decide which 
factor is more important, given his or her 
circumstances: the greater affordability of 
Medicaid or the broader provider networks 
likely to be available in the exchange. This 
approach would also promote continuity of 
coverage and care. If a Medicaid consumer’s 
income rose above 133 percent FPL, the 
consumer could stay in a Medicaid plan; if an 
exchange participant’s income fell below 200 
percent FPL, he or she could remain in the 
exchange plan.
On the other hand, such a two-way bridge 
could confuse consumers by requiring them 
to sort through a large number of plans and 
two highly dissimilar subsidy systems. It could 
also raise concerns about destabilizing spikes 
in health care claims and risk segmentation, 
as the number of BHP enrollees in any 
particular plan could be quite small, and 
BHP consumers might sort themselves into 
Medicaid and exchange plans differently, 
depending on their health status. As a result, 
this approach would require effective policies 
that pool BHP risk with broader markets, as 
discussed below.
Trade-offs for consumers
The strategies described in the previous 
section could reduce premiums and OOP 
costs below levels charged to low-income 
consumers in the exchange; provide more 
generous benefits than those offered in 
the exchange (including some tailoring of 
service delivery to meet the special needs 
of low-income populations); and avoid 
any risk of consumers losing year-end tax 
refunds or owing money to the IRS.38 Such 
approaches could also increase the number 
of families whose members can all join one 
program rather than enrolling children in 
public programs while parents participate 
in the exchange.39 
At the same time, approaches that use 
Medicaid plans to cover all residents 
up to 200 percent FPL could improve 
continuity of coverage and care and reduce 
“churning.” With the income threshold for 
transitioning between public programs and 
Table 2. Combining BHP, Medicaid, and CHIP into a single program serving low-income, uninsured residents: one illustrative policy, 2014 
Income, citizenship, and 
immigration status
Federal Funding
Benefits
Cost-
Sharing
Provider 
PaymentAdults Newly Eligible for Medicaid
Children Meeting 
CHIP’s Age 
and Income 
Requirements
Other Adults 
and Children
0 to 133 percent FPL
Medicaid 
Citizens 100% Medicaid match
Traditional CHIP 
match
Traditional 
Medicaid 
match
Immigration status qualifies 
for federally matched 
Medicaid/CHIP
100% Medicaid match
Traditional CHIP 
match
Traditional 
Medicaid 
match
Legally resident immigrants 
ineligible for federally 
matched Medicaid/CHIP
n/a
100% BHP 
payment
100% BHP 
payment
134 to 200 percent FPL
For children: CHIP
For adults: Comparable to CHIP
Citizens n/a
Traditional CHIP 
match
100% BHP 
payment
Immigration status qualifies 
for federally matched 
Medicaid/CHIP
n/a
Traditional CHIP 
match
100% BHP 
payment
Legally resident immigrants 
ineligible for federally 
matched Medicaid/CHIP
n/a
100% BHP 
payment
100% BHP 
payment
Notes: After 2016, adults newly eligible for Medicaid will receive less than 100 percent federal funding. That percentage will gradually decline to 90 percent in 2020 and subsequent years. At some point after 
2015, some CHIP-eligible children above 133 percent FPL may receive 100 percent BHP payments if Congress fails to provide new CHIP allotments. “n/a” in a cell indicates that the row includes no adults who 
are newly eligible for Medicaid. 
10
the exchange set at 133 percent FPL, more 
than 35 percent of all low-income adults 
will need to change between Medicaid 
and the exchange at least once every six 
months.40 For two reasons, raising the 
income threshold to 200 percent FPL 
would reduce the number of subsidy 
recipients moving between programs. 
First, many more people will qualify for 
subsidies at lower income levels, where ESI 
offers are less frequent.41 Second, significant 
income volatility is more widespread at 
lower income levels,42 where unstable and 
shifting employment arrangements are 
more common.
Continuity will be greatly shaped by how 
a state implements BHP. If a state covers 
adults through health plans that do not 
overlap with Medicaid—for example, if 
a state enrolls adults in a separate CHIP 
program that uses non–Medicaid plans—
continuity might not improve and could 
even worsen. Conversely, a state that uses 
the “two-way bridge” approach described 
earlier would maximize consumers’ ability 
to achieve continuous coverage and care.
On a different front, many consumers 
would experience a serious disadvantage 
if a state used BHP to extend existing 
public programs to additional low-income 
adults—namely, they would typically have 
much more limited access to providers than 
they would enjoy in the exchange. In most 
states, Medicaid pays low reimbursement 
rates that greatly limit participation by 
many types of providers.43 Provider 
payment levels, hence participation 
problems, could easily worsen during the 
next few years as states continue to grapple 
with severe budget deficits.44 
On the other hand, if federal BHP payments 
turn out to exceed baseline Medicaid costs, 
the excess could be used to raise capitated 
payments and provider reimbursement 
above Medicaid levels, without spending 
state general fund dollars. 45  Using any such 
excess in this way would help a state meet 
the statutory requirement that federal BHP 
payments must be spent on BHP members.46
Even if federal funding through BHP 
does exceed baseline Medicaid costs by 
a margin consistent with current private 
markets, using the additional dollars to 
raise reimbursement rates is unlikely, in 
most states, to replicate fully the breadth 
of provider networks offered by typical 
commercial insurance. Nevertheless, as in 
some CHIP programs, access to care could 
exceed that provided by Medicaid.  
More generally, if low-income consumers 
receive BHP through the plans and providers 
currently serving Medicaid and CHIP, they 
will lose access to some private plans in 
the exchange. However, BHP may preserve 
consumers’ access to “safety net” plans and 
affiliated providers that, in the past, specialized 
in serving low-income communities 
through Medicaid and CHIP but that may 
not be offered in the exchange.47 If a state 
implements BHP along the lines discussed 
here, plans experienced in working with low-
income communities could continue doing so 
with low-income consumers whose incomes 
exceed Medicaid levels. 
One final consumer issue is important. 
BHP, like subsidies in the exchange, is 
limited to individuals without access to 
affordable, comprehensive ESI, as explained 
above. Medicaid eligibility does not impose 
that limitation. If adults with incomes 
above 133 percent FPL lose Medicaid, 
those offered affordable, comprehensive 
ESI will become ineligible for federally 
funded subsidies, whether or not their state 
implements BHP. 
Issues for states
Budget savings
Using BHP to provide low-income adults 
with coverage similar to that furnished 
by Medicaid or CHIP would let states 
terminate optional Medicaid coverage for 
adults with MAGI above 133 percent FPL, 
without increasing such adults’ health care 
costs or cutting their benefits. For example, 
pregnant women in most states receive 
Medicaid up to at least 185 percent FPL.48  
 
Federal Medicaid law forbids charging such 
women premiums or OOP cost-sharing for 
pregnancy-related services. If these women 
lose Medicaid and shift to the exchange, 
the state would save money, but the women 
would be charged more and might receive 
less prenatal care. If such women instead 
were covered through BHP, the state would 
save the same amount by terminating their 
Medicaid eligibility, but BHP coverage 
could be structured to shield affected 
women from increased costs.49 
Similar results apply in states that, today, 
cover parents (or other non-elderly 
adults) with MAGI between 133 and 200 
percent FPL. When Connecticut developed 
its above-described proposal for BHP 
implementation, for example, Dr. Jonathan 
Gruber of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology projected that it would save 
approximately $50 million a year in general 
fund expenditures for Medicaid-eligible 
parents without increasing their premiums 
or OOP costs and without reducing 
benefits.50 
Medically needy coverage provides 
an additional opportunity for state 
savings, one that does not involve 
cutting back eligibility.51 Offered in 
most states, medically needy programs 
cover a combination of long-term care, 
catastrophic medical expenses, and 
chronic care after a beneficiary incurs a 
certain level of health care costs (“spend-
down”).52 Under ACA, medically needy, 
non-elderly adults between 133 and 200 
percent FPL will receive comprehensive 
coverage through the exchange. This will 
save money for medically needy programs, 
as formerly uninsured adults will take 
longer to meet Medicaid spend-down 
requirements. However, to increase such 
savings by further delaying the point when 
such requirements are met, a state could 
implement BHP to lower OOP costs below 
levels in the exchange and to cover some 
long-term care services that fall outside 
traditional private insurance.53  
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Exchange size
If a state implements BHP, fewer 
individuals will be covered through 
the exchange. Urban Institute 
microsimulations of the effect of ACA 
suggest that, in the average state, BHP 
implementation would reduce from 8 to 
6 percent the proportion of non-elderly 
residents receiving individual coverage 
through the exchange (Figure 3). With 
exchange group markets projected to reach 
an additional 8 percent of non-elderly 
residents, BHP will reduce total enrollment 
in the average exchange from 16 to 14 
percent of all residents. 
Such shrinkage should not imperil 
exchanges. For example, the Massachusetts 
commercial exchange, Commonwealth 
Choice, has been stable with fewer than 
40,000 enrollees, or less than 1 percent 
of the state’s non-elderly population.55 
Inapplicable to ACA, which resembles the 
Massachusetts reform law, are suggestions 
that as many as 100,000 covered lives 
are needed for exchange viability. Jost 
explained this concern as follows: 
“Small insurance pools, being 
potentially volatile and susceptible 
to destabilization by large claims, are 
problematic for insurers. According to 
one expert view, a risk pool of at least 
100,000 covered lives would probably 
be necessary to be viable.” 
Under ACA, an insurer serving the 
individual market must pool all of its 
enrollees both inside and outside the 
exchange. It is this combined risk pool, not 
exchange participants alone, that must have 
the stability insurers require before they 
will offer coverage. Jost continued: 
“If insurers cover a number of lives 
outside of the exchange, however, the 
size of the pool offered by the exchange 
may be less important. Moreover, once 
risk-status underwriting is eliminated, a 
universal insurance-purchase mandate 
goes into effect, and reinsurance and 
risk adjustment are implemented, 
the risk faced by a single plan will be 
considerably diminished ....”56  
On the other hand, if an exchange spreads 
fixed administrative costs over a smaller 
pool of enrollees, costs per enrollee rise. 
Any resulting premium increase would 
mainly affect federal costs, but it could 
also increase amounts that non-subsidized 
consumers57 (and perhaps employers) pay 
in the exchange. In addition, implementing 
BHP could decrease an exchange’s leverage 
to improve quality, lower premiums, and 
achieve goals such as reforming health care 
delivery, increasing portability, improving 
consumer information, and holding 
insurers accountable.58 
Leverage would play out differently in a 
state that lowers spending by coordinating 
its purchasing of services through multiple 
state-administered programs. Adding BHP-
covered lives to state employee insurance, 
Medicaid, CHIP, mental health services, 
health care for prisoners, and so forth 
could modestly increase such a state’s 
ability to lower prices and improve quality 
across the full range of state-purchased 
care. Instead of trimming federal subsidies, 
the leverage provided by BHP-eligible 
covered lives could reduce state costs.
Still other states may combine all 
covered lives, both in the exchange and 
state-purchased coverage, to encourage 
reforms. For example, a state interested 
in interoperable electronic health 
records could require specified levels of 
performance from any health plan or 
provider that seeks to participate in either 
the exchange or state-purchased coverage. 
Such a state’s leverage to accomplish these 
goals would not be affected by whether 
adults with incomes between 133 and 200 
percent FPL are covered through state-
purchased BHP coverage or the exchange.  
Risk
If a state implements BHP, the risk pool 
in the exchange’s individual market may 
change as its lowest-income members 
depart. The precise nature of that change 
will depend on state demographics, of 
course. But it will also depend on state 
policy decisions. Based on previous Urban 
Institute microsimulations of ACA’s 
national effects,59 BHP implementation 
would likely affect the exchange’s risk 
pool in the average state as follows:
•		If a state combines the small group and 
individual markets, the size of the exchange 
would grow to the point that implementing 
BHP would probably have little effect.
Other Residents
84%
Individual market in 
exchange, eligible for BHP
2%
Individual market in 
exchange, ineligible for BHP
6%
Group market in exchange
8%
Figure 3. Among non-elderly U.S. residents, projected coverage through health insurance 
exchanges under full ACA implementation, by insurance market and potential BHP eligibility 
Source: Urban Institute, 2010.54 Notes: This figure shows the effects of national ACA implementation (hence, ACA implementation in the 
average state) based on HIPSM estimates. It classifies people as BHP-eligible if they have modified adjusted gross income at or below 200 
percent FPL and, without BHP, they would receive subsidized, individual coverage in a health insurance exchange.  
12
•		In a state that does not combine those 
markets:
–  If the state preserves existing Medicaid 
coverage for adults with income above 
133 percent FPL, health care costs 
will be lower for BHP members than 
for other individuals in the exchange 
because BHP members will tend to 
be younger. As a result, implementing 
BHP could modestly raise the average 
cost of individual coverage in the 
exchange.  
–  If the state shifts non-elderly adults 
above 133 percent FPL out of 
Medicaid, BHP would include some 
pregnant women and people with 
disabilities who formerly qualified for 
Medicaid.60 As a result, implementing 
BHP could either leave unchanged 
or slightly reduce the average cost of 
adults receiving individual coverage in 
the exchange.
Risk effects in either direction should not 
be exaggerated. As noted, ACA requires 
each insurer to pool all of its individual 
market enrollees. If BHP members are 
healthier than average and leave the 
exchange, costs will rise in the remaining 
individual market as a whole. The resulting 
increase in average costs will be less than 
if BHP’s impact were absorbed by the 
exchange alone.
Such effects might be avoided entirely if 
states enact policies that share risk among 
BHP plans and the individual market. 
Depending on how HHS interprets ACA, 
a state might be able to use its regulatory 
authority to subject a state-licensed insurer 
that operates a BHP plan to the same rules 
that govern the individual market. That 
would require such an insurer to pool 
BHP enrollees with its other customers 
in the individual market. In addition, 
whether or not a BHP plan is sponsored 
by a state-licensed insurer, a state might 
be able to include the plan in its risk-
adjustment and reinsurance systems.61 
Under that approach, a BHP plan with 
lower average risk levels than the rest 
of the individual market would make 
payments accordingly, thus lowering the 
burden borne by other individual market 
plans. If BHP enrollees turn out to be 
sicker than the average individual market 
enrollee, BHP plans would receive risk-
adjustment and reinsurance payments that 
make up the difference. If such a policy 
is allowed by HHS and achieves its goals, 
BHP implementation should not affect the 
overall risk level of the individual market 
because it would simply move consumers 
between plans that share risk together.  
Conclusion
In some ways, this paper’s analysis is 
necessarily tentative. State decisions about 
whether to implement the BHP option 
will be affected by guidance the federal 
government has not yet issued to interpret 
ACA. The characteristics of each individual 
state will also be important in shaping 
the impact of BHP on both consumers 
and state government. That said, it is 
clear, even at this early stage, that the BHP 
option deserves serious consideration by 
states seeking to provide their low-income 
residents with affordable and continuous 
coverage while improving state fiscal 
circumstances in 2014 and beyond.
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Endnotes 
1  ACA §1331(d)(2).  
2  Another potential source of administrative dollars 
for BHP is some of the funding that otherwise 
would have covered exchange administration. 
3  It is not completely clear whether states have 
the option to extend BHP to some but not all 
individuals described in the statute. While this is 
one of many issues that will need to be resolved 
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), the most direct reading of the 
statutory language is that a state implementing 
the BHP option must cover all individuals who 
meet the four criteria listed in the text. See ACA 
§1331(a)(1) and (e).
4  Another question requiring HHS interpretation 
is whether, in applying the 200 percent FPL 
cut-off, the same method is used to calculate 
income as applies to Medicaid; that is, will 5 FPL 
percentage points be subtracted from Modified 
Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI)? Presumably, at 
the lower-income bound for BHP eligibility, the 
same method will apply as defines the upper-
income bound of Medicaid eligibility. It is not 
clear whether a different approach will apply at the 
upper-income bound for BHP. 
5  This is the same “ESI firewall” that limits eligibility 
for tax credits and other subsidies in the exchange. 
Put differently, a consumer may neither receive 
BHP nor qualify for subsidies in the exchange if he 
or she is offered ESI that has (1) a worker premium 
cost at or below 9.5 percent of family income and 
(2) an actuarial value of 60 percent or more. 
6  In states that set the upper limit for CHIP 
eligibility below 200 percent FPL, BHP could cover 
children with incomes that are between the CHIP 
limit and 200 percent FPL.
7  In addition, for purposes of ACA, “lawful presence” 
includes some immigration status categories that 
fall outside those permitted under most types of 
federally matched Medicaid eligibility.  
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